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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to analyse whether a greater number of interlocks on the board 
and compliance with the majority of corporate governance recommendations have any 
effect on the results of IBEX 35 companies. In order to do this, we will focus on the 
theory of resource dependence and propose two hypotheses which will collate the 
effect of interlocks and the compliance of recommendations on the performance of 
these companies. This effect will be measured using ROA and ROE on a sample of the 
35 companies that comprised the IBEX during 2014. Using this, the results show that 
interlocks have no significant effect on the performance of businesses and the 
compliance of recommendations has a negative effect. 
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dependence 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
INDEX 
 
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………….. 4 
Previous Literature …………………………………………………………………………. 6 
Methodology …………………………………………………………………………………. 9 
Sample and data …………………………………………………………………..… 9 
Dependent variables ……………………………………………………………..... 10 
Independent variables ………………………………………………………...…… 10 
Control variables …………………………………………………………………… 11 
Models ………………………………………………………………………………. 12 
Results ………………………………………………………………………………………. 13 
1. Descriptive Statistics ………………………………………………………………. 13 
Table 1 …………………………………………………………………….………… 13 
2. Linear Regression ………………………………………………………………….. 16 
Table 2 ………………………………………………………………………………. 17 
Table 3 ………………………………………………………………………………. 20 
Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………...…….. 22 
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………... 24 
Annex 1 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 27 
Annex 2 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 29 
Annex 3 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 31 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years greater importance has been given to the existence of Interlocks- 
These are known as those directors who are on the board of two or more companies 
simultaneously. These connections between different companies emerged in America 
in the early twentieth century (Mondéjar and Irurzun, 2013) allowing communication 
between different companies. This was done by the creation of social networks that 
connected different companies through their directors (Poveda, Sicilia, Simo and 
Sallan, 2014). 
The existence of interlocks could explain a possible reduction of competition, since the 
existence of interlocks between companies in the same sector makes it easier when 
taking measures to reduce such competition. However, this is not the only focus, it also 
makes it possible among companies that are connected to exchange resources in 
order to carry out better practices. Another important aspect of these interlocks is the 
prestige that can be provided to companies as directors of a large company also form 
part of the board of another, thus providing a good image to the company and to the 
stakeholders (Sicilia and Sallan, 2008).  
As with any other aspect, the existence of Interlocks has not been without criticism, 
such as that of Mizruchi and Marquis regarding the lack of clarity that exists in 
explaining what interlocks really represent. There have been few researchers with 
access to the board of directors therefore it has not been possible to show with 
certainty the explanation of ties between companies. On the other hand, possible 
absences have also been found, such as the minor supervision that managers should 
do over the work of the board, as well as less independence on the work of the 
directors which may result in an abuse of management (Andres, Blanco-Alcántara and 
Lopez-De-Foronda, 2014). 
Despite this, we cannot ignore the role that this union, through the interlocks, makes 
between different companies, both in the behaviour and the results of the interlocking 
companies. This is what makes the ties between companies formed through interlocks 
the subject of several studies, and remains a topical issue. We can point to the different 
theories that currently show some of the reasons why companies are willing to have 
interlocks with other companies.  These could be due to different reasons such as 
coordination between the different companies to obtain lower competition, resourcing 
through such enterprises and the acquisition of control of these (Poveda et al., 2014). 
Of the various theories available we can emphasize the Resource Dependence 
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Theory. This shows how the performance of the company is affected by interlocks 
providing  greater resources to the different companies, while on the other hand the 
Agency Theory suggests that greater resources increases the likelihood of opportunism 
by management and agency costs and therefore can affect the performance of the 
company (Zona, Gomez-Mejia and Withers, 2015). 
In order to establish hypotheses that will later be contrasted empirically, the project is 
focussed on the Resource Dependence Theory, to analyse the effect a greater number 
of interlocks have on company performance. Thus, the board and interlocks can be 
considered as a mechanism of corporate governance to increase the resources that 
connect businesses within their environment and thus reduce possible manipulative 
practices. In addition, there are different codes in the government which propose 
certain recommendations to the board of directors in order to ensure a smooth 
operation, and can control the functions of the different members of the board (Orta 
and Sierra). 
Using this, we focus the objective of our study on the effect a higher percentage of 
interlocks has on the results of a company, both economic and financial, as well as the 
effect different governance recommendations can have on better results for businesses 
through increased monitoring of these recommendations. For this a sample of 35 
companies  which all form part of the IBEX 35 was used, and in which we collected 
data such as the number of interlocks that make up their boards, the percentage of 
recommendations that each of them comply with, the results obtained during 2014, as 
well as the size and the sector they belong to. To check the different effects of a range 
of variables on the profitability, we used the statistical program R 
As a result of this analysis we learned that interlocks have no significant effect on the 
profitability of the company, while complying with recommendations has a surprising 
negative effect on this, that is, the more compliance with recommendations, the lower 
the profitability of the company. The results also show that analysing the financial 
profitability of the previous year is very important when testing the effects of different 
variables. Likewise, we have also seen that the diversity of interlocks in different 
aspects also has no effect on the profitability of the company. 
The work is divided into 7 parts. The first part includes the introduction, and the 
presentation of the topic that will be dealt with throughout the study. In the second we 
look at earlier literature, which will refer to previous studies that have dealt with similar 
issues, mentioning the hypotheses which will be contrasted. Part three will show the 
methodology such as that used in the sample, the variables used and the model 
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followed. In the fourth, the results according to our sample can be found along with the 
conclusions reached.  It will also mention the limitations encountered when carrying out 
the research, some possible future research, and finally, a series of annexes will be 
shown relating to the topics discussed previously and the references for our work. 
 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
To begin this work, we will look at previous studies that refer to the interlocks between 
companies. In different studies various definitions of 'interlocks' can be found, among 
those the following can be highlighted: an interlock is formed "when a person is on the 
board of directors of two or more corporations providing a link or interlock between 
them" (Fitch & White 2005: 175 mentioned by Zona et al, 2015), as well as that given 
by Burt (1980) and Mizruchi (1996), which indicates that a board with interlocks is 
created when an executive or director of a company joins the board of directors of 
another company (see Shropshire, 2010). We can complete these definitions by 
incorporating the fact that the alliance the interlocks make in uniting different 
companies. As a result of this link between companies we obtain a form through which 
companies exchange information with each other (Mizruchi, 1992). This makes a 
significant impact on the company, both in reference to the government of the company 
and the performance of it. 
Having outlined these definitions, we find others that show different types of interlocks, 
such as that of Barzuza and Curtis (2014) in which we find simple and reciprocal 
interlocks. The difference between the two is that reciprocal interlocks have a director 
of their company on the board of another, while in turn, a director of the other company 
forms part of its board. On the other hand, simple interlocks are when a member of the 
board is on the board of more than one company without finding a member of those 
companies on its board in return.  
Most studies on this topic agree that the importance interlocks give to a company is 
becoming greater (Barzuza and Curtis, 2014), since they provide different networks 
through which the company obtains information which they might not otherwise get 
(Connelly and Van Slyke, 2012). In this study we emphasize the theory of resource 
dependency, because, as shown in some research from this theory, interlocks improve 
company performance through lower resource constraints (Mizruchi, 1996 and Pfeffer, 
1987 mentioned by Zona et al., 2015). Zona et al. (2015) make an analysis of this 
theory, in which they show that: “Resource dependence theory outlines how 
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organizations are subject to resource constraints and explicates actions for reducing 
these constraints”. In other words, make reference to the focus of resource 
dependence theory on the external relations of the company. With this we can see the 
results that relate interlocks with the results of the companies, because as mentioned 
by Zona et al. (2015): “ interlocks  serve  as  means  to  cope  with  external  
dependencies“. 
To this can be added, that interlocks represent a mechanism for transmitting practices 
between companies, meaning that they have access to different resources available to 
companies (Shropshire, 2010). In turn, making reference to Resource Dependence 
theory, we find studies that consider organizations as "open systems" in which their 
performance depends on the supply of resources from other companies through mutual 
exchanges, while recent analysis of this theory supports a positive relationship 
between interlocks and the results of the company (Zona et al., 2015).Meanwhile, 
another reason why interlocks are so important is that they provide a reliable way with  
low cost information through which companies communicate (Haunschild, 1993) 
Regarding the above, the importance of good partnerships between different 
companies is emphasised, since as indicated by Haunschild and Beckman (1998) 
"well-connected directors do, indeed, increase the value of firms they govern". Thus 
indicated Zona et al.(2015): “a board interlock may serve as a signal of the quality of 
the firm”. In this way, being linked to a company with a good connection on the board 
increases the possibility of obtaining information as quickly as possible, which may 
increase the prestige and influence of companies (Barzuza and Curtis, 2014). Similarly, 
we can say that when a company has interlocks with other companies, this may 
increase the feeling of prestige its investors have of it because of the prestige the 
companies have with those they are linked (Sicilia Espin, Lordan González and 
Gonzalez-Prieto, 2011). This increase in both the prestige and the influence of 
business can be important for future investors as they want to know the functioning of a 
company before investing, and this can provide additional information when most times 
investments are made with limited information (Connelly and Van Slyke, 2012). 
Generally studies on interlocks mainly focus on the benefits they bring to the different 
companies and put less emphasis on the damage they sometimes make to different 
companies. For this reason some of these articles should be included as a 
consequence of links between companies. First we  can highlight that of Podonly (2001 
cited in Sullivan and Tang, 2013) which states, “The existing literature on board 
interlocks has not paid sufficient attention to the role of board interlocks as “prisms” that 
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provide informative cues about the focal firm and subsequently affect the decision-
making processes of other firms”, this may be because the interlocks can influence the 
governance of companies, disseminating information related to corporate practices in 
different interlocks (Barzuza and Curtis, 2014) . In turn Sullivan and Tang (2013) 
analyse the possible shortcomings that may arise, such as the possibility that an 
interlock in two different companies can affect the results of one company by wanting 
greater benefits for the other, as well as the possibility of seeking to pursue the results 
of one company depending on the needs or objectives of the other. 
Another aspect to consider is the quality of the different interlocks and the 
innovativeness of the company as this may affect both the interest in the company and 
companies with which it shares interlocks (Sullivan and Tang, 2013). Following this, we 
emphasize the reference made by Hallock (1997 cited in Sullivan and Tang, 2013) 
regarding the effect interlocks can have in monitoring and advising the board. In turn, 
Hwang and Kim, and Larker et al. (2009, 2005 cited Sullivan and Tang, 2013) state that 
good communication of the board of directors could be favourable for advice, although 
it could impair the function of supervision. It is likely that many of these problems arise 
due to the abandonment of monitoring which should be made to the directors (Andrés 
et al., 2014). Therefore the control mechanisms of the managers might be considered 
as a relevant and necessary action to ensure the proper functioning of the company. 
All this has meant that in recent years major investigations into corporate governance 
has been done, particularly into the relationship between this and the performance of 
the company. Following these investigations a series of recommendations have been 
published on several occasions by the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores 
(CNMV) in which a guide to how companies should act is shown marking a model in 
the structure of the board. These recommendations are intended for listed companies 
regardless of their size and level of capitalization, as stated in the Code of Good 
Governance (2015). So, based on the theory of resource dependency we can say that 
the board is an important link between the company and the resources necessary to 
maximize performance. A board that is well connected with their environment and puts 
the principles of good governance into practice will have greater access to resources 
and will make the company perform better (Fernández, Alonso and Rodríguez, 2013). 
The study of interlocks has been of interest to various authors such as Zona et al. 
(2015). They have focused on several theories including the theory of resource 
dependency is in the case of Barzuza and Curtis (2014) and Connelly and Van Slyke 
(2012) among others. Most of these have focused on the benefits that interlocks 
 
9 
contribute to the different companies in which they find themselves. With the support of 
these studies and the theory of resource dependency, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: Those companies with a higher percentage of interlocks will obtain better results. 
H2: Those companies which follow a greater level of corporate governance 
recommendations will perform better 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and data 
For our study we collected data on the composition of boards during 2014, as well as 
the financial data for 2014 of the 35 companies that comprise the IBEX 35. IBEX 35 
companies are those listed on the Spanish stock market and have a certain amount of 
market capitalization and with a certain quality of their transactions (Poveda et al., 
2014). 
To obtain data on the directors each company contains and the type of directors they 
are was used the Corporate Governance Report for each of them, which was accessed 
through the website of the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). 
Moreover, the SABI database was used for financial data in order to analyse the 35 
companies. This is financial data such as total assets, total equity, ROA, ROE. To 
gather the data from the following companies: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 
Banco de Sabadell, S.A., Banco Popular Español, S.A., Banco Santander, S.A., 
Bankia, S.A., Bankinter, S.A.,  Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, Sdad Holding de Mdos Y 
Stmas Fin., S.A., Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica, S.A., Iberdrola, S.A., Indra 
Sistemas, S.A., Jazztel, PLC.,  Repsol, S.A. y Técnicas Reunidas, S.A. the Annual 
Financial Report of each was used, which can be found on the website of the CNMV, 
as data from these companies was not available on the SABI database. 
Moreover, to perform the necessary calculations to test our hypotheses we used the 
statistical program R. Using this program the results can be seen later obtained 
through our model of how different variables affect the profitability of companies . 
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Dependent variables 
As dependent variable we took ROA, as we wanted to measure the performance of 
companies based on their annual assets and this is the most widely used research tool 
to measure approximate performance (Zona, et al., 2015). While on the other hand, to 
check the effect on alternative performance, we have also taken as a dependent 
variable ROE. The ROA, or economic profitability, measures the profitability of total 
assets of the company. This has been measured as ordinary income before taxes 
divided by the total assets. As for the ROE or financial return, this measures the 
benefits earned by partners in relation to monetary units they have invested. This is 
measured as the ratio between profit before tax and equity. 
Independent variables 
In this study we have considered two independent variables: the percentage of 
interlocks that are in a company and the quality of corporate governance. For the 
percentage of interlocks, we first obtained the number of interlocks that exist in different 
companies using the Annual Corporate Governance Report 2014 for each of them. In 
section C.1.12 we found the number of directors of companies who in turn are part of 
the board of directors of other entities of the group. We then measured this variable as 
the number of interlocks divided between the total of directors of the company. In our 
sample we noted that in the case of the company Abengoa, S.A. it is assumed that 
there are no interlocks since the Corporate Governance Report 2014 of the company 
does not mention any interlocks with companies outside the group and there is still no 
data registered for 2015. Moreover, to obtain data on interlocks in the company Mapfre, 
SA, the number of interlocks in 2015 instead of 2014, have been taken into account, 
since in 2014 the Corporate Governance Report did not give any information regarding 
this. In this case the interlock cited in 2015 existed in the company in 2014, so we 
considered this as the number of companies in the sample is small making it necessary 
to obtain this value. The data collected on this variable and their percentage with 
respect to total directors can be found in Annex 1. Furthermore, in Annex 2, the 
percentage of interlocks differentiated between men and women, and between internal 
and external representing total interlocks is shown. 
As for the quality of corporate governance, we have relied on compliance with the 
Good Governance Recommendations of the Unified Code, which was found on the 
website of the CNMV. As Domínguez, Rodríguez, Vives and Tapias mentioned, the 
recommendations are understood as "a document prepared by a third party that 
collects a series of statements or objectives addressed to a number of companies, 
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formulated in general terms, all related to corporate governance  of these. These 
statements or objectives, known as recommendations, are intended to describe the 
best practices in corporate governance”. Societies must indicate whether or not to 
comply with these recommendations and if not, to explain why. In our sample, to 
assess the percentage of compliance within each of the companies, compliance has 
been weighted as follows: if it complies with the recommendation = 1, partial 
compliance = 0.5 and non-compliance = 0, and if none of the recommendations have 
been applied, this has not been included in the calculations for total applicable 
recommendations. So once the compliance weighting is done, the number of 
recommendations complied, partial compliance, and non-compliance is recounted. To 
then find the total number of compliances, the sum of the number of recommendations 
complied with is multiplied by 1 plus the number of partial compliances multiplied by 
0.5.   On the other hand, the addition of the total recommendations applicable is made, 
which includes those fully compliant, those partially compliant and those which failed to 
comply. Once these two additions have been made, in order to know the total 
percentage of recommendations complied in relation to those applicable, we divided 
the total number of recommendations complied divided by the total applicable 
recommendations. In the case of this variable, the results of these calculations and the 
percentage they represent out of the total, can be found in Annex 1. 
Control variables 
As control variables the size of both the company and the board in 2014 was 
considered, along with ROE and ROA in 2013 and the sector the companies belong to, 
as it is believed that these types of variables have a strong influence on corporate 
performance. The data obtained from these variables may be found in Annex 3. 
As for the size of the company, this expresses the volume of each one of the 
magnitudes that make up the company and is measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Companies with a smaller size may be faced with major difficulties, since it 
is likely that the resources available are limited (Cruz, Jimeno and Sonda, 2014). 
Regarding the size of the board, the total number of directors, including interlocks, 
internal, external and both men and women were taken into account. This variable was 
measured as the natural logarithm of total directors. 
Other control variables that have been taken into account to see the effect on 
profitability have been ROA (return on assets) and ROE (return on equity) in 2013, as it 
is believed that the results achieved in the previous year may have an effect on those 
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of 2014. For this reason, for the analysis of both returns the corresponding result of the 
previous year was used. 
The Sector has also been included as an additional variable. Due to the limitations of 
the sample size, the decision was made to make a separation between financial 
companies and other companies. To do this, a dummy variable was used, assigning a 
value of 1 for companies that are part of the financial sector, including insurance 
companies, which in this case was Mapfre, SA, as well as a value equal to 0 for all 
other companies outside this sector. 
Models 
In this case a linear regression model was used. This model has been estimated using 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method and the above variables. With this the 
following models have been obtained: 
(I) 
ROA_2014=  +      +      +         +           +         +
          +  
(II) 
ROE_2014=  +      +      +         +           +         +
    E     +   
 
Where: 
• tmñ_emp: corresponds to the size of the company 
• tmñ_consj: corresponds to the size of the board 
•% _CC: corresponds to the percentage of interlocks the company has 
•% _RC: corresponds to the percentage of recommendations complied with by the 
company 
• sct_emp: corresponds to the sector to which the company belongs 
• ROA_2013: corresponds to the economic profitability of the company in 2013 
• ROE_2013: corresponds to the financial profitability of the company in 2013 
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Finally, to analyse whether there is multicollinearity between the different variables 
used for this research, an analysis has been made based on the use of variance 
inflation factors (VIF). Through this, it was found that there is no multicollinearity 
between the variables used in our models. 
 
RESULTS 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLE 
(PROXY) 
Min. P25 Mean Median P75 Max. 
 
CC 0 2 4,2 4 6 11 4,2 
%CC 0 0,1597 0,3077 0,3157 0,4495 0,6667 0,3156 
RC 42,5 46,25 47,74 48 49 52 47,7428 
%RC 0,8333 0,9238 0,9557 0,97 0,99 1 0,9556 
tmñ_emp 
(millions) 
0,01551 2,246 151,9 6,458 36,14 2.080 
 
tmñ_emp 
(ln) 
9,649 14,623 15,961 15,681 17,322 21,456 
 
tmñ_consj  8 11,5 13,31 13 15 19 13,3142 
tmñ_consj 
(ln) 
2,079 2,441 2,566 2,565 2,708 2,944 
 
ROA_2013 -21,275 0,1072 6,1472 3,6686 6,0525 62,180 6,1472 
ROE_2013 -269,315 1,175 5,657 7,159 17,364 79,207 5,6572 
sct_emp 
(dummy) 
0 0 0,2571 0 0,5 1 
 
Source: Own elaboration  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables mentioned above. In this case 
two rows have been produced for each of the following, for the size of the company 
(tmñ_emp), the size of the board (tmñ_consj), the interlocks (CC) and 
SD 
0,2571 
151,8 
2,566 
15,9607 
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recommendations complied with (RC). The absolute values are shown in the first row 
of each variable and in the second, in the case of the size of the company and the 
board, the results of the natural logarithm is based on the total of each size 
respectively, and for the interlocks and recommendations complied with, we show the 
percentages that each of these represents as a total of all directors and applicable 
recommendations respectively. 
As we can see, the table shows the minimum, maximum, 25 and 75 percentiles and the 
mean, median and variance of each of the variables. Firstly, we see that the average 
size of companies is approximately 151,900,000 assets, with a minimum of 15,510 
assets belonging to Endesa, S.A. and the maximum of 2.080.000.000 assets 
corresponding to Grifols, SA. Moreover, we find the variable that refers to the natural 
logarithm of total assets, in which it can be seen that the average is 15,961, with a 
minimum 9,649 and a maximum of 21.456. This is followed by the size of the board, in 
which the results that refer to all directors who are in business are shown. In this case 
the company with the greatest number of directors on its board is CaixaBank, S.A. with 
a total of 19 directors and Jazztel PLC. With a total of 8 directors as the company with 
fewest directors, the average of these directors being 13,31. As for the variable that 
refers to the natural logarithm of the board size we obtain an average of 2,566, a 
minimum of 2,079 and a maximum of 2,944. With regard to the interlocks in 
companies, the average is 4.2 people, with a minimum of interlocks in companies of 0 
and a maximum of 11 directors. The company in which no interlock was found is 
Abengoa, S.A., in contrast with a total of 11 interlocks at Telefónica, S.A. as the IBEX 
35 company with most interlocks to its name. As for the recommendations complied, 
we see that the average is 47.74, which would represent 91.8% of recommendations 
complied by companies. In this sample, there are a total of 53 recommendations in the 
Corporate Governance Report and when checked against our analysis, the minimum 
number of recommendations that IBEX 35 companies complied with is 42.5, which is 
83,33% recommendations complied with on the total and maximum of 52 
recommendations, 100%. With this it can be added that according to our observations 
the companies that have complied with the fewest recommendations are Amadeus It 
Holding, S.A. and Sacyr, S.A. and the company complying with most recommendations 
is Gamesa Corporacion Tecnologica, SA. On analysis of this data, the economic and 
financial profitability in 2013 was found. In terms of return on assets (ROA) we see that 
the average return on the companies is 6.1472%, a minimum of -21.275% and a 
maximum of 62.18%. The company with the highest profitability in 2013 was Gamesa 
Corporacion Tecnologica, S.A. and the company with lowest profitability is Acciona, 
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S.A. even managing to make losses. With regard to the financial profitability we get an 
average of 5,657% and with a minimum of -269.315%, for Fomento de Construcciones 
y Contratas, S.A. with large financial losses, and a maximum of 79.207% for Gamesa 
Corporacion Tecnologica, S.A.. To sum up, it can be said that the best performing 
company both for economic and financial returns obtained for 2013 is Gamesa 
Corporacion Tecnologica, S.A. Finally are the results of the dummy variable in our 
sample chosen sector. Companies in the financial sector and insurance companies are 
considered as 1, while the other sectors are 0. As a result it can be seen approximately 
25.71% of the companies in the IBEX 35 belong to the financial or insurance sector, 
while the rest belong to companies in other sectors. 
Next we move on to the interlocks and recommendations complied with to obtain more 
detailed information. 
• Interlocks 
In the case of interlocks the median obtained of 4 is highlighted. Companies with this 
number of interlocks were Amadeus IT Holding, SA, Banco de Sabadell, SA, Endesa, 
SA, Iberdrola, SA Mediaset Spain Communication SA and Sacyr, S.A. This indicates 
that of the other companies half have less than 4 interlocks and the other half more 
than 4. Meanwhile, we turn to look deeper into companies with the minimum and 
maximum interlocks to their name. With the minimum of interlocks, as mentioned 
earlier, is Abengoa, SA. Going further into the Corporate Governance Report 2014, 
obtained from the website of the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), 
we find that this requires directors to devote all the time and effort necessary to working 
in the company, as do the directors of Abengoa, SA, who perform their functions only in 
this company or its group companies. In the case of the maximum of directors we have 
Telefónica, SA. From the Corporate Governance Report 2014 we find that, although 
directors are obliged to devote the time and effort necessary to carry out its functions, 
there is no rule on the number of boards to which a director may belong, although they 
must inform the Nominating, Compensation and Corporate Governance Committee, of 
other obligations if they could interfere with the performance of duties as a director. 
• Compliance with Recommendations  
Focussing on compliance with recommendations, we analyse those companies with 
the least and most compliance with recommendations complied with. For this the 
recommendations found in the CNMV, Statistics on Corporate Governance of listed 
companies in 2014 have been analysed. First, as mentioned above, one of the 
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companies with least compliance with recommendations is Amadeus it Holding SA. It 
can be observed that of a total of 53 recommendations, 41 have been complied with, 
partial compliance 3, non-compliance 4, and not applied 5. Secondly, we have Sacyr, 
SA as one of the companies that complied with the lowest number of 
recommendations. In this case, we found that of the 53 recommendations, 40 were 
complied with, partial compliance 5, non-compliance 6 and not applied 2. Analysing 
both companies, we discover that of the recommendations not applied in each case, 
they only coincide in number 35 , which reads: "that the remuneration linked to 
company earnings takes into account any qualifications stated in the external auditor's 
report that reduce such results", and in the case of non-compliance of 
recommendations, again they only coincide in one, in No. 3 which states: "that, 
although not expressly required under company law, operations involving a structural 
modification of the company are subject to the approval of the general meeting of 
shareholders ", in which 3 cases in particular are exposed. 
Finally, in the case of the company with most complied recommendations we have 
Gamesa Corporacion Tecnologica, SA, which of the 53 recommendations, 52 were 
complied with and only 1 not applied. In this case the one not applied is No. 2, which 
states the following: "That when the parent company and a subsidiary are both listed, 
both should publicly and precisely define: a) the respective areas of activity and 
possible business relations between them as well as those of the listed subsidiary with 
other group companies, and b) the mechanisms in place to resolve possible conflicts of 
interest that may arise ". In this case, the recommendation not applied only coincides 
with one not applied by Amadeus It Holding, S.A .. 
 
2. Linear Regression 
In Table 2 we collate estimates of various model parameters and standard error of 
each of these parameters. In turn, the coefficient of determination of the variables (R2) 
and its set value, the F-test, which evaluates the joint significance of the variables in 
the model, the P-value, through which we can see if these variables provide important 
information when evaluating profitability, and the number of observations. As for the 
number of observations, this has been determined by the R statistical program at the 
time the estimates were made, being in all 35 cases. 
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Table 2: Effect of interlocks and recommendations complied on the profitability of the 
company. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PROFITABILITY 
                   (b) 
 constant 195,8665* 593,721† 
 (91,4091) (302,043) 
 tmñ_emp -1,8149 -1,069 
 (1,1205) (3,595) 
 tmñ_consj -25,5489† -36,407 
 (13,95) (44,826) 
 %CC 2,1837 -16,223 
  (14,8087) (48,921) 
 %RC -104,3972 -514,767† 
 (76,6851) (254,484) 
 ROA_2013 0,2101  
 (0,1984)  
 ROE_2013  1,213*** 
  (0,157) 
 sct_emp 8,624 29,112 
 (6,4433) (21,328) 
 R2 0,3144 0,7012 
 R2 adjusted 0,1675 0,6372 
 F-test 2,14† 10,95*** 
 P-value 0,07995 2,824e-06 
 N.obs 35 35 
The table reports regression results of corporate performance using 
OLS estimator. † p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Resource: Own elaboration 
In model (a) we have taken as a dependent variable return on assets (ROA), while in 
the model (b) the dependent variable is the return on equity (ROE). With regard to the 
(a) 
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first model, we can say that the control variable that shows the size of the board is a 
statistically significant variable at 10%, although in a negative way, ie, the greater the 
number of directors the more negatively this affects the economic profitability, while the 
rest of the variables can be said not to be statistically significant. With this we could say 
that hypotheses 1 and 2 raised above would not be supported, since as we have seen 
the percentage of recommendations complied and number of interlocks have no 
significant effect on the economic result. Yet we can say that these variables together 
explain 31.44% variance of ROA, and that the joint contribution of independent 
variables provides meaningful information when estimating the returns on assets. This 
affirmation can be maintained at a P-value of 10%. 
As for the model (b), there are two significant variables, one of which is a control 
variable. These two variables are the percentage of complied recommendations by 
different companies, which is statistically significant at 10%, and the control variable 
that shows return on equity in 2013 statistically significant at 0.1%. With this we see 
that the other variables, including interlocks, have no significant effect on the ROE. 
With the analysis so far, we see that the percentage of complied recommendations is 
significant in the profitability of the company, although this does not positively affect, on 
the contrary, that is, the more recommendations the company complies with, the 
smaller the financial profitability. Therefore in this case we cannot support the 
hypothesis 1 and 2 laid out at the beginning of our investigation, because although the 
percentage of recommendations complied affects the ROE it does not do so positively, 
and on the other hand, interlocks have no significant effect on this. The negative effect 
of recommendations complied may be because the implementation of the 
recommendations made by the companies is not yet reflected and the realization of 
these could have their effect on performance in later years to that of the analysis. On 
the other hand, this negative effect could also be because companies refer to the 
inclusion of such recommendations in their practices to reflect a good external image, 
although they have not been applied in depth, therefore they do not have the expected 
effect on performance. We can see that the combination of these variables explain a 
70.12% variance of financial profitability and in this case the contribution of all 
independent variables provides meaningful information with a P-value of 0.0002824% 
when estimating financial profitability. 
Having made these observations, and seen that interlocks have no effect on 
profitability, the possibility could be that this is because within this variable several 
aspects are included. Therefore a separate analysis has been carried out to prove 
whether interlocks divided into several aspects are significant or not on returns of either 
 
19 
assets or equity. For this we have separated the interlocks into two aspects: women 
interlocks and external interlocks, thus individually analysing the possible effect these 
may have on profitability. 
In order to check these other aspects in the same way as previously, Table 3 has been 
drawn up collating the same information as in Table 2 adapting to the new data. 
The new variables added to these tables are: 
•% CC_M: corresponds to the percentage of interlocks that are women 
•% CC_ext: corresponds to the percentage of interlocks that are directors external to 
the company  
This new data has been chosen for several reasons. Firstly, we wanted to differentiate 
women from men, as we found studies such as Todaro, Abramo and Godoy (2002) 
studying the possibility of increased efficiency of women compared with men in the 
workplace.  Also we highlight the small number of women in relation to men still found 
on the boards of companies. On the other hand, we distinguished external interlocks 
from internal. This distinction has been made mainly due to the fact that external 
directors are those who do not have any relationship with the company different from 
that of director, whereas internal directors might also be shareholders, which may 
cause them to focus more on the benefits and not the company. 
In the first two columns of the table (a and b) is the effect that the interlocks are 
women, and in the other two columns (c and d) the effect of external interlocks. The 
effect these variables have on the economic profitability can be seen in (a) and (c), 
while to see the effect they have on the equity performance there are columns (b) and 
(c). That is, in the case of columns (a) and (b) we have replaced the variable 
"percentage of interlocks" for the new variable "percentage of women interlocks" and in 
(c) and (d) "percentage of external interlocks". With regard to the other variables, they 
remain the same in all four cases and the same as those used in the model definition. 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
Table 3:  The effect of women interlocks and external interlocks on the profitability of 
the company. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
  DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PROFITABILITY 
          (b)   
 constant 197,3592* 620,0933*   191,1730* 602,5334† 
 (90,6534) (299,7693)   (89,4712) (299,276) 
 tmñ_emp -1,938† -1,0307   -1,9891† -0,9234 
 (1,0794) (3,4983)   (1,0645) (3,4815) 
 Tmñ_consj -24,947† -38,1197   -24,9967† -38,5028 
 (13,8104) (44,2031)   (13,6511) (44,2477) 
 %CC_M 3,2794 11,6595   
 (7,5554) (24,9794)   
 %CC_ext      -11,6767 -16,8436 
     (13,2457) (44,8553) 
 %RC -105,7461 -547,2147*   -86,3401 -510,4492† 
 (74,8037) (248,7590)   (75,4835) (255,4636) 
 ROA_2013 0,2150     0,2051  
 (0,1979)    (0,1953)  
 ROE_2013  1,2099***  1,2040*** 
  (0,1568)  (0,1584) 
 sct_emp 8,4626 29,3387    9,0285 30,3372 
 (6,4140) (21,2404)   (0,1953) (21,3464) 
 R2 0,3185 0,7023 0,3324 0,7015 
 R2 adjusted 0,1725 0,6386 0,1894 0,6376 
 F-test 2,181† 11,01*** 2,324† 10,97*** 
 P-value 0,0751 2,684e-06 0,06024 2,783e-06 
 N.obs 35 35 35 35 
The table reports regression results of corporate performance using OLS estimator. 
† p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Resource: Own elaboration 
(a) (c) (d) 
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With the results of Table 3, it is proved that whatever the type of interlock, regardless of 
classification, they have no significant effect on either economic or financial 
performance of the companies. Yet we can see that in columns referring to economic 
profitability (a and c) the size of the board and company size are significant variables 
for profitability, being statistically significant at 10%. This contrasts with the result of the 
first column of Table 2, as discussed earlier, where the only significant variable is the 
size of the board. 
In contrast, the columns which refer to financial profitability such as column (b) and (c), 
we see that the variables that have a significant effect on these returns are the 
percentage of complied recommendations and the financial profitability of 2013. 
Although it is noteworthy that for the model that takes as its variable women interlocks, 
the percentage of complied recommendations are statistically significant at 5%, 
however, for the model that uses external interlocks, the percentage of 
recommendations complied is statistically significant at 10%, while in both cases the 
financial profitability of 2013 is statistically significant at 0.1%. Notably, as is the case in 
Table 2, Table 3 shows the effect of the percentage of complied recommendations on 
financial return as negative, so the higher percentage of recommendations complied 
the lower the profitability. 
Yet we can say that in all columns the joint contribution of the different variables to the 
model is significant. In the case of economic profitability, it is in column (c) in which the 
variables explain at a greater percentage the variance of ROA  with 33.24%, and in the 
case of financial profitability column (d) where ROE variance is explained in greater 
percentage, with 70.15%. In all columns, we note that the contribution of all 
independent variables and control provide important information. An example of this is 
the result of P-value for each column, which is below 10%. These results affirm the 
rejection of the hypotheses, because in none of the cases do the percentage of 
interlocks have a significant effect on the profitability of the company, while the 
percentage of complied recommendations has a negative effect on it. 
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CONCLUSION 
From this we can say that many studies have analysed, from various viewpoints, the 
board of directors of the company, although very few have focused on the interlocks 
despite the topic being very present in large companies in recent years. Therefore, the 
objective of our work has focused on proving: the effect that interlocks can have on 
business performance and, the effect of other variables such as the recommendations 
proposed by the Code of Good Governance, for companies to carry out good practice. 
The estimate of our sample was carried out through the data collected from the 35 
companies that comprise the IBEX 35 using their Corporate Governance Reports, 
reports of annual accounts, as well as data found in the SABI database. Then, as a 
dependent variable economic and financial profitability, as independent variables the 
percentage of interlocks and the percentage of recommendations complied by 
companies,  as control variables, the size of the company, the size of the board, 
economic and financial profitability of the previous year and the sector as a dummy 
variable were added 
Firstly, an analysis of the different models was made using the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and statistical program R. In this first analysis method, we found that interlocks 
as a whole have no significant effect on economic and financial returns, while, although 
the recommendations complied do not have a significant effect on the economic 
returns they do on the financial, to a negative effect. Secondly, we wanted to check the 
possibility that interlocks had no effect on profitability due to encompassing all types of 
interlocks, therefore we divided interlocks into two types: interlocks by gender and 
interlocks by type of director. Having made the division, the same analysis used 
previously was carried out twice, once replacing the interlocks variable for women 
interlocks and the other by external interlocks, keeping all other variables equal. With 
these new analyses, it was found that even when disaggregating the interlocks, they 
have no effect on the profitability of the company. The result of all this shows, that 
neither of the two hypotheses at the start of the project would be accepted. 
For this research we relied mainly on the Theory of Resource Dependence. This was 
found in previous research, such as that of Zona et al. (2015). It should be emphasised 
that Resource Dependency Theory argues that boards of interlocks are considered as 
a way to increase resources and improve the performance of the company (Mizruchi; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, see in Zona et al., 2015). Other authors like Connelly and 
Van Slyke (2012) also make a similar statement, ie, he argues that the participation of 
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interlocks on the boards of several companies makes companies closer, which means 
the interlocks have some effect on company performance. Alongside these statements, 
our study found that although interlocks serve as intermediaries between the 
companies with which they share interlocks, thus giving them access to the different 
resources that each has, they have no significant effect on the performance of the 
companies. 
As mentioned above, this project has been conducted with a sample made up of 
companies that comprise the IBEX 35, this meant a limitation had to be assumed due 
to the small number of companies that could be counted on. It is therefore believed that 
for future research a similar work could be done with a larger sample, such as all 
companies listed on the Spanish stock market, in order to test the hypotheses on a 
greater number of companies. Another suggestion to expand the sample is the 
inclusion of several years of the different variables to see the changes in greater depth, 
as in this case the focus was on 2014, using only 2013 of the variables ROE and ROA 
to see their effect on different models. Another limitation found in our research was the 
use of a linear regression model, since this is quite simple, one of its characteristics is 
that it assumes that the error term is equal to 0, this being a random variable that picks 
up the possible effect that the explanatory variables are not included in the model and 
assumes they have not been tested in this work. It is therefore proposed that future 
studies should check better the adequacy of the model to estimate, as well as the 
applied technique.  
Finally, another set of suggestions on possible future investigations that could be 
carried out are, for example, conducting an analysis of the ideal number of interlocks 
there should be on the board to get higher returns, since it is likely that an excessive 
amount of interlocks may affect the result negatively. Moreover, future studies would be 
interesting in order to analyse the effect of liquidity and debt on profitability. Liquidity 
would be interesting, because not all assets can as easily be converted into cash 
quickly without losing their value. As for debt, it would be interesting to analyse the 
relationship between the amount of equity of a company and the debts that it maintains 
both over the long and the short term. Finally, we also propose a possible analysis of 
supervision, ie, analyse the effect of increased supervision of boards by shareholders / 
owners on profitability as it is likely that increased monitoring would detect the 
weaknesses / gaps faster resulting in more effective practices. 
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ANNEX 1 
IBEX 35 CC %CC RC %RC 
Abengoa, S.A 0 0% 46,5 91,18% 
Abertis Infraestructuras, S.A 3 17,65% 47 92,16% 
Acciona, S.A. 3 23,08% 46 93,88% 
Acerinox, S.A. 6 40% 48 96% 
ACS, Actividades de Construcción 
y Servicios, S.A. 
6 35,29% 48 92,31% 
Amadeus It Holding, S.A. 4 40% 42,5 88,54% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, 
S. A. 
2 14,29% 51,5 99,04% 
Banco De Sabadell, S.A. 4 28,57% 48,5 98,98% 
Banco Popular Español, S.A. 2 13,33% 49,5 99% 
Banco Santander, S.A. 7 50% 49 100% 
Bankia, S.A. 5 45,45% 48 100% 
Bankinter, S.A. 1 10% 51 100% 
Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, 
Sdad Holding de Mdos y Stmas 
Fin., S.A. 
5 41,67% 48,5 97% 
Caixabank, S.A. 9 47,37% 47,5 91,35% 
Distribuidora Internacional De 
Alimentación, S.A. 
5 50% 44,5 98,89% 
Enagas, S.A. 2 13,33% 48,5 97% 
Endesa, S.A. 4 44,44% 45 93,75% 
Ferrovial, S.A. 5 41,67% 48,5 93,27% 
Fomento De Construcciones y 
Contratas, S.A. 
3 21,43% 48 92,31% 
Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica, 
S.A. 
3 30% 52 100% 
Gas Natural SDG, S.A. 6 35,29% 44,5 90,82% 
Grifols, S.A. 1 7,69% 44,5 92,71% 
Iberdrola, S.A. 4 28,57% 50,5 97,12% 
Indra Sistemas, S.A. 6 46,15% 51 98,08% 
Industria De Diseño Textil, S.A. 3 33,33% 49 98% 
International Consolidated Airlines 
Group, S.A. 
6 46,15% 47 97,92% 
Jazztel, PLC. 1 12,5% 49 100% 
Mapfre, S.A. 1 5,6% 49 92,45% 
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Mediaset España Comunicación, 
S. A. 
4 30,77% 46 93,88% 
Obrascon Huarte Lain, S.A. 8 66,67% 48 100% 
Red Eléctrica Coporación, S.A. 2 20% 50 100% 
Repsol, S.A. 10 66,67% 49,5 99% 
Sacyr, S.A. 4 28,57% 42,5 83,33% 
Técnicas Reunidas, S.A. 1 8,33% 47 95,92% 
Telefónica, S.A. 11 61,11% 45,5 91% 
 
Resource: Own elaboration 
 
The variables expressed in the table refer to: 
• CC: Number of interlocks that exist in the company 
•% CC: Percentage of interlocks to total directors that are in the company 
• RC: Number of complied recommendations by the company 
•% RC: Percentage of recommendations complied with by the company in 
relation to recommendations applicable. 
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ANNEX 2 
IBEX 35  %CC_M %CC_H %CC_ext %CC_int 
Abengoa, S.A 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Abertis Infraestructuras, S.A 0% 100% 100% 0% 
Acciona, S.A. 33,33% 66,67% 100% 0% 
Acerinox, S.A. 16,67% 83,33% 100% 0% 
ACS, Actividades de Construcción 
y Servicios, S.A. 
0% 100% 100% 0% 
Amadeus It Holding, S.A. 25% 75% 100% 0% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, 
S. A. 
50% 50% 100% 0% 
Banco De Sabadell, S.A. 0% 100% 100% 0% 
Banco Popular Español, S.A. 100% 0% 100% 0% 
Banco Santander, S.A. 28,57% 71,43% 71,43% 28,57% 
Bankia, S.A. 20% 80% 100% 0% 
Bankinter, S.A. 0% 100% 100% 0% 
Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, 
Sdad Holding de Mdos y Stmas 
Fin., S.A. 
20% 80% 100% 0% 
Caixabank, S.A. 11,11% 88,89% 77,78% 22,22% 
Distribuidora Internacional De 
Alimentación, S.A. 
40% 60% 100% 0% 
Enagas, S.A. 100% 0% 100% 0% 
Endesa, S.A. 25% 75% 75% 25% 
Ferrovial, S.A. 0% 100% 80% 20% 
Fomento De Construcciones y 
Contratas, S.A. 
0% 100% 100% 0% 
Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica, 
S.A. 
0% 100% 100% 0% 
Gas Natural SDG, S.A. 0% 100% 100% 0% 
Grifols, S.A. 100% 0% 100% 0% 
Iberdrola, S.A. 50% 50% 100% 0% 
Indra Sistemas, S.A. 16,67% 83,33% 83,33% 16,67% 
Industria De Diseño Textil, S.A. 0% 100% 66,67% 33,33% 
International Consolidated Airlines 
Group, S.A. 
33,33% 66,67% 100% 0% 
Jazztel, PLC. 100% 0% 100% 0% 
Mapfre, S.A. 100% 0% 100% 0% 
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Mediaset España Comunicación, 
S. A. 
25% 75% 75% 0% 
Obrascon Huarte Lain, S.A. 25% 75% 87,50% 12,50% 
Red Eléctrica Coporación, S.A. 50% 50% 100% 0% 
Repsol, S.A. 0% 100% 90% 10% 
Sacyr, S.A. 0% 100% 75% 25% 
Técnicas Reunidas, S.A. 0% 100% 100% 0% 
Telefónica, S.A. 9,09% 90,91% 90,91% 9,09% 
 
Resource: Own elaboration 
 
The variables expressed in the table refer to: 
•% CC_M: Percentage of women interlocks in the company to total interlocks 
•% CC_H: Percentage of men interlocks in the company to total interlocks 
•% CC_ext: Percentage of external interlocks in the company to total interlocks 
•% CC_int: Percentage of corporate interlocks in the company to total interlocks 
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ANNEX 3 
IBEX 35  T. Activos tmñ_emp T. Consj tmñ_consj ROA_2013 ROE_2013 sct_emp 
Abengoa, S.A 11.731.983 16,28 16 2,77 2,28 17,61 0 
Abertis Infraestructuras, S.A 13.367.262 16,41 17 2,83 4,37 10,21 0 
Acciona, S.A. 5.481.531 15,52 13 2,56 -21,28 -36,75 0 
Acerinox, S.A. 2.907.955 14,88 15 2,71 -0,29 -0,92 0 
ACS, Actividades de Construcción y 
Servicios, S.A. 
6.981.181 15,76 17 2,83 
17,91 55,27 0 
Amadeus It Holding, S.A. 1.571.977 14,27 10 2,30 18,19 46,04 0 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S. A. 403.841.000 19,82 14 2,64 -0,24 -2,80 1 
Banco De Sabadell, S.A. 159.943.441 18,89 14 2,64 0,15 2,27 1 
Banco Popular Español, S.A. 151.032.546 18,83 15 2,71 0,28 3,37 1 
Banco Santander, S.A. 496.802.000 20,02 14 2,64 0,09 0,83 1 
Bankia, S.A. 230.687.599 19,26 11 2,40 0,13 3,08 1 
Bankinter, S.A. 60.011.850 17,91 10 2,30 0,43 8,69 1 
Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, Sdad 
Holding de Mdos y Stmas Fin., S.A. 
490.160 13,10 12 2,48 
32,69 40,97 1 
Caixabank, S.A. 22.208.076 16,92 19 2,94 4,47 6,94 1 
Distribuidora Internacional de 
Alimentación, S.A. 
2.076.166 14,55 10 2,30 
5,52 18,32 0 
Enagas, S.A. 6.099.886 15,62 15 2,71 5,68 16,62 0 
Endesa, S.A. 15.514 9,65 9 2,20 8,70 17,12 0 
Ferrovial, S.A. 10.565.614 16,17 12 2,48 6,41 14,52 0 
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Fomento De Construcciones y 
Contratas, S.A. 
6.168.524 15,63 14 2,64 
-8,17 -269,32 0 
Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica, 
S.A. 
916.763 13,73 10 2,30 
62,18 79,21 0 
Gas Natural SDG, S.A. 33.179 10,41 17 2,83 0,59 1,52 0 
Grifols, S.A. 2.080.429.926 21,46 13 2,56 7,25 11,58 0 
Iberdrola, S.A. 50.072.051 17,73 14 2,64 4,62 7,16 0 
Indra Sistemas, S.A. 3.131.593 14,96 13 2,56 3,67 10,43 0 
Industria De Diseño Textil, S.A. 6.457.971 15,68 9 2,20 27 53,94 0 
International Consolidated Airlines 
Group, S.A. 
7.307.592 15,80 13 2,56 
5,70 6 0 
Jazztel, PLC. 1.612.414 14,29 8 2,08 5,04 5,07 0 
Mapfre, S.A. 9.360.890 16,05 18 2,89 3,22 4,25 1 
Mediaset España Comunicación, S. A. 1.531.794.984 21,15 13 2,56 -1,83 -2,28 0 
Obrascon Huarte Lain, S.A. 4.653.798 15,35 12 2,48 2,53 16,99 0 
Red Eléctrica Coporación, S.A. 2.304.444 14,65 10 2,30 23 24,46 0 
Repsol, S.A. 19.833.000 16,80 15 2,71 -6,94 -9,40 0 
Sacyr, S.A. 3.670.200 15,12 14 2,64 -3,04 -27,96 0 
Técnicas Reunidas, S.A. 2.181.664 14,60 12 2,48 4,80 64,83 0 
Telefónica, S.A. 85.847 11,36 18 2,89 0,04 0,14 0 
 
Resource: Own elaboration 
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The variables expressed in the table refer to: 
• T. Assets: Total assets of the company for 2014 
• tmñ_emp: Company size expressed as a natural logarithm of total assets 
• T. Consj: Total number of directors there are in the company 
• tmñ_consj: board size expressed as the natural logarithm of total directors 
• ROA_2013: economic performance of the relevant business year 2013 
• ROE_2013: Financial performance of the relevant business year 2013 
• sct_emp: companies belonging to the financial and insurance sector -1, other sectors 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
